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ABSTRACT 
 
Information Aggregation Mechanisms are economics mechanisms designed 
explicitly for the purpose of collecting and aggregating information. The 
modern theory of rational expectations, together with the techniques and 
results of experimental economics, suggest that a set of properly designed 
markets can be a good information aggregation mechanism. The paper 
reports on the deployment of such an Information Aggregation Mechanism 
inside Hewlett-Packard Corporation for the purpose of making sales 
forecasts. Results show that IAMs performed better than traditional methods 
employed inside Hewlett-Packard. The structure of the mechanism, the 
methodology and the results are reported.   
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1. INTRODUCTION1 
 
 Information and knowledge in social systems frequently exist only as 
dispersed insights, local data, opinions and guesses and their importance to 
the operation of social systems, regardless of the subjective or “soft” form, is 
widely recognized.  However, exactly how such information and knowledge 
finds its way to useful social purposes and whether or not the information 
that exists in the system is fully used, appears to be highly dependent on the 
nature of organizations and institutions that support its transfer and use.  The 
variety of processes found in organizations, such as committees, polling 
processes, networks of contacts, reporting, etc. developed for the purpose of 
improving information flow suggests both the importance and complexity of 
the task. 
 
          The work reported here finds its early motivation in the classical work 
of Hayek (1948), who suggests that prices in naturally occurring, free 
markets make important contributions to information transmission in 
economies. More precise suggestions of exactly the type of markets that  
                                                 
1 The financial help of the National Science Foundation and DARPA are gratefully acknowledged. Effort 
sponsored by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and Air Force Research 
Laboratory, Air Force Material Command, USAF, under agreement number F30602-00-2-0623.  The US 
Government is authorized to reproduce and distribute reprints for Governmental purposes notwithstanding 
any copyright annotation thereon.  The views and conclusions contained herein are those of the authors and 
should not be interpreted as necessarily representing the official policies or endorsements, either expressed 
or implied, of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), the Air Force Research 
Laboratory, or the U.S. Government. 
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might be successful and how it might take place are found in the theoretical 
literature of rational expectations. The operational development of theory, 
the exploration of the possibilities that real markets present and the testing of 
various market architectures that might support information aggregation are 
strictly the product of experimental economics. This paper takes the 
methodologies of experimental economics one step further and reports on 
the implementation and use of market processes that were designed 
explicitly for the purpose of performing the task of accumulating and 
organizing information that is held in a widely dispersed and subjective 
form.   
 
    As is reflected in the title of the paper, the analysis is devoted to the 
design and implementation of an "Information Aggregation Mechanism". 
The freedom of design removes any need to restrict the inquiry to a 
particular institution or some class of institutions that have evolved 
naturally. The question raised by the research is whether or not the capacity 
of any competitive processes can be harnessed and developed into an 
information aggregation tool that can be of use to manage business.  Indeed 
the inquiry can be extended to any type of system that might successfully 
perform the task. The particular Information Aggregation Mechanism 
developed and implemented here is closely related to mechanisms suggested 
by the theoretical and experimental literature on markets.  
 
Economists have long understood that, in theory, the prices in 
properly designed markets reflect the collection of all the information 
possessed by all the traders about future events. Almost daily the business 
pages interpret market behavior as having anticipated events or as having 
integrated a complex pattern of information into the price. Intuitions that are 
supportive of such ideas are readily available. Reflecting on every day 
notions about the way that people learn from observing other people can 
form a common sense impression of how an aggregation mechanism might 
work.  For example, the observation of many people eating at a restaurant 
suggests that it is a good place to eat and increases the likelihood that 
someone will try it. Or, if a crowd is observed looking at something then 
there is a propensity for additional people to look, thinking that the crowd 
might be seeing something of interest.  The actions of the crowd suggest 
they know something and others instinctively incorporate this possibility in 
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their own information base. At a more formal level the idea is seen in stock 
market reports that the markets "anticipate" events like inflation, individual 
company reported profits, reports on the economy, weather reports, 
prospects of disruptive events like strikes or wars, etc.  The "insiders", those 
with bits and pieces of information, those with good "intuition" about events 
are registering their beliefs through their actions in the markets. That is, 
according to interpretation the markets are like a vacuum sweeper, collecting 
and aggregating information that is otherwise highly decentralized and 
privately held. The transformation of these common sense properties into the 
principles of a science and the design of specific types of processes to 
enhance such features have resulted in what we will call Information 
Aggregation Mechanisms (IAM). 
 
 A joint research project between Caltech and Hewlett-Packard 
Laboratories was initiated in 1996 to investigate the possibilities of 
implementing an Information Aggregation Mechanism. Many business 
examples share the following characteristic: small bits and pieces of relevant 
information exists in the opinions and intuition of individuals who are close 
to an activity. Some examples are supply chain management issues, demand 
forecasting, new product introduction, and supply uncertainties. In many 
instances, no systematic methods of collecting such information exist.  In 
these cases very little is known by any single individual but the aggregation 
of the bits and pieces of information might be considerable. For instance, it 
is extremely difficult to combine subjective information such as the 
knowledge of a competitor’s move with objective information such as 
historical data.  In a perfect world, with unlimited time and resources, a user 
of such information could personally interview everyone that might have a 
relevant insight but such luxury does not exist.   Gathering the bits and 
pieces by traditional means, such as business meetings, is highly inefficient 
because of a host of practical problems related to location, incentives, the 
insignificant amounts of information in any one place, and even the absence 
of a methodology for gathering it. Furthermore, business practices such a 
quotas and budget settings create incentives for individuals not to reveal 
their information.  The principles of economics together with new 
technologies that exist for creating markets and related mechanisms suggest 
that in might be possible to develop a new approach that avoids many of the 
practical problems.   
 
The research posed here asks many fundamental questions that can 
only be answered by field demonstration. Abstract theory or laboratory 
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experiments might help but in the end cannot provide answers.  What types 
of mechanism might work?  How can it be deployed within a business or 
other types of organizations? Does it really work?  Of course there are many 
scientific issues that one would like to resolve before an application is 
attempted.  How is the performance of the system related to the psychology 
and decision biases of individuals?  How can one deal with incentive 
problems in which individuals might large incentives to conceal or 
misrepresent what they know?  What rules and mechanisms might be needed 
for different underlying information structures?  If markets are thin or the 
number of participants few, how will the performance of the system be 
affected? How can we find the people with the relevant information and how 
do we know that they knew something of relevance anyway?  The 
mechanisms are supposed to aggregate information that is there and not 
create it from nothing. If the participants know nothing, the mechanism will 
produce nothing.  
 
 Some questions have been answered with laboratory experimentation. 
The proof that properly designed markets can aggregate information has 
existed in the experimental economics literature for over a decade.2 
Experimentalists have discovered that markets populated by humans can 
indeed perform in a manner suggested by the theory but that ability is 
closely related to the market organization.  
 
 The feasibility of deploying an IAM in a business environment is 
suggested by the Iowa Electronic Markets, and comparisons of major 
features of the Hewlett Packard IAM with the Iowa Electronic Markets 
(IEM) are of interest. While there are important overlaps, there are 
substantial differences in the environments for which these mechanisms 
were applied. There are also differences in the methodologies themselves. 
The IEM are focused on events that are observable to a broad based 
population at large, such as election outcomes, certain stock prices, or the 
                                                 
2 The experimental demonstration is first found in Plott and Sunder (1982, 1988). This early paper 
demonstrated that the ability of markets to aggregate information is sensitive to the market architecture.  In 
particular, this early work demonstrated that compound securities are not as reliable as indicators as a 
complete set of state dependent instruments.  The conditions under which a single compound security is 
reliable are isolated in Forsythe and Lundholm (1990) The need for selecting proper instruments is 
underlined by demonstrations of markets that can equilibrate at patterns that are not fully revealing of 
information such as cascades (Anderson and Holt, 1997; Hung and Plott, 2001) or misleading such as 
mirages (Camerer and Wiegelt, 1991) or bubbles ( Smith et al, 1988; King et al. 1993; Porter and Smith, 
994; Lei et al, 2001).  In fact, some types of market organization facilitate no information aggregation at all 
as is the case of the winners curse in sealed bid auction markets (Kagel and Levin, 1986; Lind and Plott, 
1991). See Sunder (1995) for a summary, or aspects of search (Sunder, 1992). 
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actions of the Federal Reserve.  For example, in the Iowa Electronic 
Markets, participants are allowed to buy and sell “shares” of candidates in 
U.S. and even foreign elections. In such cases, it is not clear that the 
information to be captured involves any substantial degree of aggregation in 
the sense that the concept is applied for the operation of the IAM. In the case 
of public events, much of the relevant information may already be public 
knowledge. It is not clear that IEM participants have specific, specialized 
information that is not available for the general public. Many public reports, 
polls and summaries exist in the press and obviously affect IEM activities. 
Participants in the IEM have self-selected for participation, which has no 
specific bearing on whether they have private information or not. Thus, the 
predictions of the IEM could reflect an effective and sophisticated system of 
polling, a collection of personal intentions, a coordination mechanism of 
public information, or a combination of polls.  While related, such patterns 
of underlying information can be differentiated from a pattern of private 
information (beyond the personal intention to vote) that resides in small 
amounts across the population. 
 
By contrast, only a relatively small number of people were chosen for 
participation in the Hewlett Packard IAM. They were selected specifically 
from different parts of the business operation because they were thought to 
have different patterns of information about the targeted event. These 
patterns of information, including market intelligence, specific information 
about big clients, and pricing strategies, were in need of aggregation. In 
addition, there were no public summaries of information available to the 
participants during the operation of the IAM. The official forecasts were not 
known until after the IAM closed.  In fact, antidotal evidence suggests that 
the activities on the IAM were used as inputs to HP official forecasts in 
more than one occasion. 
 
The Iowa Electronic Markets were thick, with many participants 
operating over a long period of time while the markets in the HP IAM were 
thin and operated over very short periods. Such differences lead to 
procedural and market architecture differences.  Differences in the nature of 
the prediction task also lead to different market instruments. The primary 
predictions of the IEM are point predictions, such as vote shares in political 
events, which are designed to compare well with polling techniques. The 
overlap between the IEM and the HP IAM is greatest in the IEM “winner 
take all” markets. Such markets are state contingent securities and are based 
on the same principles as the HP IAMs reported here. This overlap between 
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the two substantially different types of exercises can further attest to the 
basic principles’ robustness in widely varying environments. 
  
2. THE TASKS 
 
 A total of twelve predictions were performed over a period of three 
years.  These are listed in Table 1.  Included in the table are  (i) the events to 
be predicted, (ii) when the IAM was conducted ,(iv) the number of 
participants, (v) the duration over which the information aggregation 
mechanism operated and (vi) some information about the structure of the 
mechanism. 
     
 The first event prediction attempted was the level of profit sharing 
bonus in a particular half year. The bonus is calculated based on a pre-
defined formula of HP’s profit. A total of eight possibilities were defined, 
e.g. below 2%, between 2% and 3%, etc. and a state contingent market was 
opened for each.   
 
All other events predicted were related to sales of products. 
Predictions for eight products were conducted, which are labeled 
{A,B,C,D,E,F,G,H} for purposes of discussion and analysis.  As can be seen 
in the table predictions were performed more than once for some of these 
products and only once on others.  In some cases dollar sales were predicted 
for some month and in other cases it was the number of units sold. 
   
 Typically, the prediction was for monthly sales for a month three 
months in the future, with the exception being the first two exercises for 
which the predicted event was one month ahead.  In all cases the information 
was gathered for a week with the markets being open during lunch and in the 
evening every day.  Management did not want participants being 
preoccupied with the task during the working day when pressing issues 
needed attention. 
 
3. THE MECHANISM: Technical Issues 
 
 Technical issues are of two types.  The first issue is related to the 
instruments that will be used in the markets.  Exactly what will be the items 
that are bought and sold in the markets?  The second issue is related to the 
market mechanism, the technology for making bids, asks and trades. 
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 The primary choice of instruments was between a single compound 
security, which paid a dividend in proportion to the level of sales, if sales are 
the item to be forecast, and multiple, state contingent contracts.  Because it 
is known from experiments that single compound securities can have 
difficulty with information aggregation Plott and Sunder (1988) a decision 
was made to use a complete set of state contingent contracts. 
 
 Arrow-Debreu securities were chosen as the instruments because of 
the aggregation success that they have exhibited in the laboratory (See Plott, 
2000) for an example of the types of laboratory experiments that had been 
used to explore this issue.)  The space of possible outcomes was partitioned 
into a finite number of subsets. Each subset was “tied” to a security. After 
the final outcome was revealed, the security, which contained the final 
outcome, was determined. This “winning” security paid off a fixed amount. 
All other securities paid nothing. 
 
Since all the events chosen to be predicted lie on the positive real line, 
securities were constructed by partitioning the real line into about 10 or so 
(exact number depends on the event) intervals. Each interval was given a 
name and with each interval there was an associated security with the same 
name that traded in a market with that name. Thus the interval 0-100 would 
be associated with a security named 0-100 that traded in a market named 0-
100. The interval 101-200 would be associated with a security named 101-
200, etc. If the final outcome fell in an interval, the corresponding security 
would pay, say, one dollar per share at the end of the experiment. All other 
securities would pay nothing.  
      
 Of course the exact amount of the payoff per share was a parameter 
that could be changed but in the business exercises reported here it was 
always $1.00 per share.  A higher payoff per share would place more value 
on the share but the payoff per share interacts with the total cost of the 
exercise and the potential volume of trades and related market liquidity.  
 
 Each participant was given a portfolio of shares in markets and cash.  
In some exercises all participants were endowed equal shares in all 
securities.  In other exercises participants were endowed with shares in every 
other security, alternating which security was first across participants.  The 
unequal distribution of endowments was used to encourage trading by 
attempting to make sure that the initial endowments of securities did not 
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approximate the ultimate equilibrium.  Of course the total number of shares 
and cash distributed determined the overall cost of the exercise. 
 
 The market mechanism employed to support the markets was the web 
based, double auction markets of the Marketscape software, which was 
developed at the Laboratory of Economics and Political Science at Caltech. 
All the markets for an event were organized on a single web page for easy 
access. As can be seen from the screen shot in Figure 1, each of the different 
markets occupies a line on which the bid, ask and last trade price are all 
displayed. Links to a complete time series of trades in their graphical or as 
raw data were available. Links also existed to HP data bases, which allowed 
participants to review data held by HP. A participant could enter a buy offer, 
a sell offer or acceptance of an offer through the web form on the page. 
Orders were compared to the other side immediately. If a trade was possible, 
it was executed and if not the order was placed in an order book. The best 
offers were listed on the main market web page. The whole book of offers 
was available for each market at the click of a button.   
 
 Participants were located in a diverse geographical area. Some may 
have been traveling during the experiments. Participation was anonymous. 
However, each participant was assigned a subject ID number for each 
experiment. During the experiment, the subject ID number of the person 
who made offers and transactions were public knowledge. Participants had 
the ability to track behavior of other subjects within the same experiment if 
they wished to. 
 
 
  4. THE MECHANISM: Business Issues 
 
 Implementation of a market institution in a business environment 
offers different challenges than implementation of the same institution in a 
laboratory environment. The major issues are participant selection and 
motivation together with other business constraints. 
 
  Selection of participants is of primary importance.    In an academic 
experiment, participants are given appropriate amount of information by 
virtue of experimental controls and procedures. Therefore, there is no issue 
of selecting participants for what they might know since all of them, by 
design, will have appropriate information. The only issue is whether or not a 
mechanism is aggregating information that is known to exist. 
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 By contrast, in a business environment, participants need to be 
selected carefully. On one hand, it is not desirable to “miss” a person with 
much information. On the other hand, it might not be efficient to include 
many people without any relevant information.  Indeed, little is known 
theoretically about the information size relative to the market that might be 
required for effective information aggregation to take place. 
 
  A second issue is ensuring participation through proper incentives and 
timing. Even if the right people are identified to participate, it is not a 
foregone conclusion that the appropriate amount of participation would be 
forthcoming. The opportunity costs of doing something other than 
participating in the forecasting exercise can be very high for the business 
people.  Consequently, a level of incentives much higher than that in an 
academic experiment is often required. Secondly, scheduling market 
sessions is also problematic. On one hand, it is desirable to have a schedule 
(for example, 24 hours for a week) to minimize conflict with other activities. 
On the other hand, it is not desirable to leave market open for long periods 
because participant will often find a lack of activities in the markets and thus 
lose interests.  Third, it is known from laboratory experiments that the ability 
of markets to predict increases as the participants have experience with the 
markets and with each other.  Thus, the incentives and the schedules should 
be such that participants enjoyed participation and were willing to repeat the 
experience with several prediction tasks. 
 
  Business constraints operate in different dimensions. First, there may 
be some hesitation to engage employees in an exercise in which they might 
lose money. Certainly this was the case in HP. Thus, we had to provide a 
small amount of cash to each participant before the market sessions. This, 
together with the budget determined together with the HP management, 
constrained the amount of stakes a participant can have in the market and 
affects incentives to trade. Secondly, the business implementation had to 
offer possibly useful information.  In particular the horizon of the 
predictions was important. Typically, forecasts are not valuable if they are 
made with horizons less than 3 months. Therefore, market sessions need to 
be conducted 3 months before the event to be predicted.  
 
 
5. PROCEDURES 
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 The experiments were conducted with three different HP divisions. 
Typically, around 20-30 people signed up for the experiments. Business 
participation was limited to marketing and finance organizations. An 
addition of around five subjects was recruited from HP Labs in each 
experiment. The reason of adding HP Labs subjects, who had little or no 
information about the predicted event, was to increase liquidity in the 
markets.  Laboratory experiments have suggested that a small number of 
uninformed participants provide both market liquidity and a function of 
adding “consistency” to the market through a process of “reading” and 
“interpreting” the actions of others. 
 
 The markets were typically open for about a week for each event. 
Within the week, there were additional restrictions on when the markets 
were open, as was discussed elsewhere. Trading was done through at a web 
server located at Caltech. The subjects were geographically dispersed in 
California.  
 
Some effort was made to make participation anonymous. However, since 
most of our subjects worked for the same organization, we would expect 
normal interactions amongst the subject pool during the experiments.  
 
Each subject was given a 15-20 minute one-to-one instruction session from 
one of the experimenter. The experimenter explained the structure of 
incentives and the market mechanism as well as the web interface in details. 
Contact information was also given to each subject. They were encouraged 
to call if they encountered difficulties.  In addition, the participants were told 
the goals of the experiment and were told that their participation was 
important for HP business.  While this procedure is atypical of laboratory 
experiments the goal of the exercise presented here was to design and 
implement a mechanism that works and the instruction about the purpose 
was thought might help. 
 
 At the end of each exercise, the subjects were paid by checks or by the 
internal HP reimbursement procedures. 
 
6. FORESCASTS 
 
 The distributions of prices computed as the last 50% of trades in a 
market are shown for all markets for all events forecast in Figures 2A thru 
2L. The actual outcomes, the IAM predictions as well as the official 
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forecasts (if available) are also indicated on the figures. For example, event 
2 (figure 2B) shows the IAM distribution to have a single peak around 230. 
The actual outcome (the dotted line) is at 220 while the official forecast is at 
249. The IAM prediction (solid vertical line) comes in at 230 in the middle 
between the actual outcome and the official forecast. 
 
 Visual inspection shows that the IAM predictions are closer to the 
actual outcomes than the official forecasts in events 2,3,4,5,6 and 9. It is also 
worth noting that in event 3,4 and 5, the IAM predictions are so close to the 
official forecasts that they are practically on top of one another. 
 
The forecasts (predicted sales) resulting from the markets are 
contained in Table 2. The table also contains the actual sales that resulted in 
the period for which a prediction was made.  For example the outcome event 
2 was a sales level of 220 as compared to the official HP forecast of 249, 
which had a 13.182% error.  The IAM prediction for event 2 using the last 
50% of trades was 230.059 with a percent error or 4.572. 
 
A discussion of the predictions derived from the IAM is in order. The 
key issue in interpreting the results is to find a reasonable way to derive 
predictions from the market data. Theoretically, the prices of an efficient 
market should sum to the payoff of the Arrow-Debreu securities and be 
proportional to the probabilities of the states conditioned on the information 
in the market. However, in our experiments prices did not always sum to the 
right amount or stay on a stable level. Thus, the price used as an IAM 
forecast used to calculate states probabilities becomes an issue. 
 
Several options present themselves as predictive statistics. We chose 
the volume-averaged transaction price of the IAM markets as the measure. 
The averages were taken over a subset of the trades towards the end of the 
experiments. The rationale being the market achieved some sort of 
equilibrium towards the end as suggested by laboratory experiments. Since 
no objective criterion exists for choosing the number of trades to include, 
different percentages were used and the results seem to be robust with 
respect to that.  
 
The model employed assumes that for each interval the event was 
equally likely within the interval. That assumption when joined with the 
probabilities of each interval calculated from the IAM market prices, enables 
a calculation of an expected outcome. Since all events reside on the real line 
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with no upper bound, all but the upper most intervals were bounded and thus 
posed no issue in this calculation. The upper most interval, however, so to 
deal with this asymmetry two different approaches were tried. The first 
approach ignored the last interval completely since for most experiments, the 
probability placed on it was small. The second approach, assumed all the 
probability in the last interval was placed on its lower bound. Results were 
robust with respect to how expected value (of sales) was calculated. 
 
The second major issue is the choice of an appropriate benchmark to 
measure the performance of the IAM predictions. In a business environment 
information held by all individuals is not known.  It is impossible to 
benchmark the IAM predictions with respect to the total information 
available as done under laboratory conditions. The only benchmark available 
is the HP official forecast. The HP official forecast is a logical benchmark 
since it represents the "belief" of HP but it does have limitations. For 
example, the HP official forecast is not accompanied by assumptions about 
the distribution of accuracy.   In fact, the official forecast is not only a 
forecast, it is a management tool through which quotas are measured and 
compensation paid.  This dual role of the forecast means that it is expected 
and management and divisions coordinate on the assumption that the 
forecast will be met. Furthermore, HP official forecasts were only available 
in 8 out of 12 experiments that we have conducted. 
 
7. RESULTS 
 
The overall pattern of results indicates that the IAM prediction is a 
considerable improvement over the HP official forecast. The IAM 
predictions relative to official HP forecasts are found in Table 2. The actual 
outcome, HP official forecasts and their absolute percentage errors are listed. 
IAM predictions calculated with three different methods are also reported 
with their absolute percentage errors.  
 
Table 3 reports the comparison statistics between HP official forecasts 
and IAM predictions. The absolute percentage errors of the HP official 
forecasts, as well as those of IAM predictions calculated with six different 
methods are listed. T-tests were used to determine whether the HP official 
forecasts have higher errors than each of the six IAM methods. The p-values 
of these tests are reported in the same table. 
 
These form the basis of the first result. 
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RESULT 1:  Market predictions based on IAM prices outperformed 
official HP forecasts.  
 
Support: 
 
In 6 out of 8 events for which official forecasts were available the 
IAM predictions are closer to the actual outcome than the official forecast. 
T-tests also show that the absolute % errors of the official forecasts are 
higher than that of the IAM predictions. The hypothesis that the error of the 
official forecast is less than or equal to the error of the IAM prediction can 
be rejected. The result that the IAM forecasts are more accurate is robust 
with respective to different calculation methods.  Table 3 summarizes all 
forecasts and predictions errors and the t-statistic for each of the following 
definitions of volume averaged transaction prices that are used as the 
probability (after normalized) of a particular interval.  The IAM prediction is 
the interval in which sales are predicted to fall.  Thus, the predicted interval 
is sensitive to the probabilities attached to intervals and the interpretation 
attached to the highest interval.  Robustness was checked for the following 
assumptions. 
 
a. using last 40% of the trades to calculate the volume averaged price 
b. using last 50% of the trades to calculate the volume averaged price  
c. using last 60% of the trades to calculate the volume averaged price  
d. ignoring the last interval to calculate an expected value of the predicted 
variable 
e. assuming all the probability of the last interval concentrates on its lower 
bound to calculate the expected value of the predicted variable 
 
As Table 3 reveals, regardless of the definition used the results remain 
essentially unchanged.• 
 
The first result is focused only on point predictions.  However, the 
IAM also produces probabilistic information about the likelihood of possible 
outcomes. Prices in a market can be interpreted as the probability that sales 
will fall in the interval represented by the market.  Instead of producing a 
point prediction the IAM produces a whole probability distribution.  The 
next result deals with the question of whether the probability distributions 
derived from prices are consistent with actual outcomes.  
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The intuition for the test is as follows. Each event was potentially 
generated by a different probabilistic process. However, if the IAM process 
recovers the true distribution of the events, the derived distribution, unique 
to each event, should be consistent with the actual outcome. Thus, ten 
percent of the outcomes should fall below the 10% quantile of the derived 
distribution. Twenty percent of outcomes should fall below the 20% quantile 
of the derived distribution and so on. 
 
The mathematical foundation for the test uses the following argument 
and resulting proposition.  Let x ∈ R  for some finite set R of the real 
numbers and let H(x) be the probability that a random variable x takes values 
less than or equal to x under the model H.  Let F(x) be the true probability 
that the random variable x takes a value less than or equal to x. Define a 
function y = H(x) and consider the inverse correspondence H-1(y) and a 
related function H-1(y) ∈ H-1(y) which takes a single value for each y* such 
that H-1(y*) is not a single element. Such a selection can always be done with 
finite sets and with larger sets the Axiom of Choice can be applied. Of 
course y ∈ [0,1].  Let P(y) be the probability of y, so by the assumption that 
F(x) is the true probability and by using the definition of H-1(y) we have P(y) 
= F(H-1(y)). 
 
Furthermore, if F(x) = H(x) we can define a function F-1(y) such that 
 F-1(y) = H-1(y). Now if H(x) = F(x) then substituting we have the following 
proposition for y ∈ H(x) for some x. 
 
PROPOSITION:  P(y) = F( F-1(y)) ≡ y . That is, P(y) is the uniform 
distribution between 0 and 1. 
 
Now assume there are N random variables labeled x1 through xn. Let 
Hi(xi) be the probability distribution of xi under the IAM prediction. Let yi= 
Hi(zi) where zi is the observed actual outcome of xi. 
 
A direct result of the proposition above is that for all i, yi is distributed 
uniformly between 0 and 1. Furthermore, since these events are independent, 
yi is also i.i.d. 
 
Thus, testing whether yj is distributed uniformly is an indirect test of 
whether the predicted distributions (Hj) are consistent with the true 
distributions (Fj). 
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RESULT 2:  The probability distributions calculated from market 
prices are consistent with actual outcomes. 
 
Support:    
 
A Kolmogorov-Smirnov goodness of fit test was conducted on the yj 
with the null hypothesis that the yj is distributed uniformly in the interval 
[0,1]. The test was conducted with 12 data points (12 events). The ks-
statistics is 0.1743 with a p-value of 0.80. The null cannot be rejected at any 
level of reasonable significance.  
 
Thus, one can reasonably conclude that the distributions derived from 
the IAM process are consistent with the underlying distributions that 
generated the events. • 
 
The next result is another test of the accuracy of the IAM relative to 
official forecasts.  The question posed is the nature of any improvement over 
official forecasts. Does the IAM suggest adjustments in the official HP 
forecast that are in the “right direction”?  The next result reports that the 
answer is “yes”. 
 
RESULT 3:  The IAM makes accurate qualitative predictions about the 
direction that the actual outcome will occur (above or below) relative to 
the official forecast. 
 
Support: 
 
We use the following procedure to predict whether the actual 
outcomes will be above or below the official forecasts. First we calculate the 
predicted distribution based on last 50% of the trades in each market. Then 
we look at the point of the official forecast and determine whether the 
distribution is “skewed” (have more mass) to the left or the right. If the 
distribution has more mass on the right, then we predict that the actual 
outcome is going to be higher than the official forecast. Otherwise, the 
actual outcome is going to be lower than the official forecast. 
 
Using this method, the actual outcomes are consistent with the 
prediction 8 out of 8 events that had official forecasts. Please see Table 4 for 
a summary of the predictions. • 
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In addition to the results stated above several observations are listed 
below. These are related to phenomena that are either of importance to 
theory or are of interest for establishing a correspondence with laboratory 
experimental data.  
 
OBSERVATION 1:  Theoretical arbitrage profits existed. 
 
In all the experiments, prices summed to be greater than the winning 
payoff. In theory, it violated the no arbitrage conditions. However, to take 
advantage of the arbitrage conditions, individuals needed to execute multiple 
trades when fluctuations of prices were substantial. Thus, although 
violations of theoretical arbitrage conditions were observed in the 
experiments, it is likely that there were actually no practical arbitrage 
opportunities. However, this alone only explains why the sum of prices can 
be substantially away from the efficient point (summed up to be the winning 
payoff). It does not explain why in all 12 experiments the sum of the prices 
was always above the winning payoff. 
 
OBSERVATION 2:  No significant information about the state was 
identified in the dynamics observed during the course of the experiments.  
 
For each experiment, trading data were divided into 10 subsets, each 
containing 10% of the trades in sequence. The first subset contained the first 
10% of the trades. The second subset contained the second 10% of the trades 
and so on. Market prices were calculated using trades in each subset and 
point predictions were calculated for each subset based on the prices. No 
significant trends in the sequences of predictions are observed.  
 
One speculation is that information aggregation occurred fairly early. 
Under that hypothesis, any variations in the predictions during the course of 
the experiments were due to drift around equilibria. 
 
OBSERVATION 3:  The number of sell offers exceeded the number of buy 
offers. 
 
In all experiments, there were more sell offers than buy offers. This 
phenomenon is typical when prices are going down. This is intuitively 
consistent with what we know about information markets. In the early stage 
of the markets when little information was reflected, prices were around the 
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same levels in all possible outcomes. As the market progressed and 
aggregated more information, prices associated with most outcomes (except 
the few likely ones) decrease. We observed more sell offers than buy offers 
because prices associated with most of the outcomes were decreasing. 
 
7. CONCLUDING REMARKS AND BUSINESS QUESTIONS AND 
ISSUES 
 
 The goal of this research is to take known information aggregation 
mechanisms, attempt to deploy them within a real business environment and 
determine whether or not they will “work”. The  IAM chosen was a set of 
markets consisting of a complete set of Arrow-Debreu securities. Laboratory 
experiments suggested that a mechanism of this form would be successful.     
The IAM was successfully implemented in several Hewlett-Packard 
business divisions.  Numerous roadblocks were encountered, such as 
scheduling conflicts and a lower than ideal level of participation, which are 
non-issues in academic experiments but are extremely important in the 
business environment.  
 
 The results are encouraging. Not only did the IAM market predictions 
consistently beat the official HP forecasts; the outcomes predicted are 
consistent with the probabilistic predictions of the IAM.  
 
 The methodology has generated interest in the HP business 
community, despite a number of research issues, because of  advantages this 
method has that other forecasting methods do not have. 
 
(i) The IAM is flexible. It can be used to aggregate any type of information 
possessed by different people. It involves a natural methodology for 
quantifying subjective, qualitative, information and giving weights to the 
opinion of different people for the purpose of information aggregation.  The 
task is performed giving not only a point forecast but also a complete 
probability over the range for which the value of some unknown variable is 
to be predicted. 
 
(ii) The methodology is scalable by number of participants, timing of 
participants and location of participants. There  are no practical limits to  the 
number of people that can participate. With markets conducted over the 
Internet, hundreds and even thousands of people can participate either at the 
same time or at different times. Traditionally, businesses collect and 
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aggregate information  through a process of meetings, which not only limits 
the number of participants but also the time frame for information collection. 
 
(iii) The methodology tends to be incentive compatible.  Incentives to hide 
information, misrepresent information or simply ignore requests for 
information are either eliminated or limited. Furthermore the markets are 
designed to give incentives to the participants’ to acquire information about 
future events and use this information wisely in the market.   
 
Obviously this is only the first step in turning special designed 
economics mechanisms into forecasting devices. Once feasibility is 
established a number of questions naturally arise. Do alternative 
mechanisms exist that will aggregate information better? Does the structure 
of information matter and if so, can an appropriately designed IAM take 
advantage of that? Can an IAM not only produce a prediction but also 
simultaneously help management ascertain which participants have 
information.  That is, can it be designed to attract those with good 
information and discourage those with bad information?  Theory and 
experiments suggest that improvements along such dimensions are possible 
but the feasibility, when subject to business constraints, remains to be 
established. 
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Table 1: Summary of Experiments 
  
 
Event to be predicted Number of 
active 
participants 
Date [time] of 
experiment 
Experiment 
Duration 
Number of 
Markets 
1 Profit sharing 
percentage to be 
announced by upper 
management 
16 10/96  
[11:00 AM-1:00 
PM; 4:30 PM-
8:00AM] 
1 week 8 
2 Next month sales  
(in $) of product A 
26 11/96 
[11:00 AM-1:00 
PM; 4:30 PM-
8:00AM] 
1 week 9 
3 Next month sales 
 (in units) of Product B 
20 01/97 
[11:00 AM-1:00 
PM; 4:30 PM-
8:00AM] 
1 week 9 
4 Quarter ahead monthly 
sales (in units) of 
product C 
21 05/97 
[11:00 AM-1:00 
PM; 4:30 PM-
8:00AM] 
1 week 10 
5 Quarter ahead monthly 
sales (in units) of 
product D 
21 05/97 
[11:00 AM-1:00 
PM; 4:30 PM-
8:00AM] 
1 week 10 
6 Quarter ahead monthly 
sales (in units) of 
product B 
21 05/97 
[11:00 AM-1:00 
PM; 4:30 PM-
8:00AM] 
1 week 10 
7 Quarter ahead monthly 
sales (in units) of 
product C 
24 06/97 
[11:00 AM-1:00 
PM; 4:30 PM-
8:00AM] 
1 week 10 
8 Quarter ahead monthly 
sales (in units) of 
product D 
24 06/97 
[11:00 AM-1:00 
PM; 4:30 PM-
8:00AM] 
1 week 10 
9 Quarter ahead monthly 
sales (in units) of 
product E 
24 06/97 
[11:00 AM-1:00 
PM; 4:30 PM-
8:00AM] 
1 week 10 
10 Quarter ahead monthly 
sales (in units) of 
product F 
12 04/99 
[11:00 AM-1:00 
PM; 4:30 PM-
8:00AM] 
1 week 8 
11 Quarter ahead monthly 
sales (in units) of 
product G 
12 04/99 
[11:00 AM-1:00 
PM; 4:30 PM-
8:00AM] 
1 week 8 
12 Quarter ahead monthly 
sales (in units) of 
product H 
7 05/99 
[11:00 AM-1:00 
PM; 4:30 PM-
8:00AM] 
1 week 8 
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Table 2: Summary of Forecasts and Errors 
 
    IAM  Predictions   
Event    Last Trade 
Average 
Last 60% 
Trade 
Average 
Last 50% 
Trade 
Average 
Last 40% 
Trade 
1 Outcome 8.770 IAM Prediction 9.619 9.092 9.259 9.369 
 HP Forecast None Tail Prob Truncated 0.040 0.038 0.043 0.041 
 % error None % error 9.683 3.672 5.571 6.829 
2 Outcome 220.000 IAM Prediction 234.065 230.136 230.059 230.294 
 HP Forecast 249.000 Tail Prob Truncated 0.009 0.008 0.009 0.009 
 % error 13.182 % error 6.393 4.607 4.572 4.679 
3 Outcome 1152.000 IAM Prediction 1766.399 1814.155 1793.875 1781.017 
 HP Forecast 1838.000 Tail Prob Truncated 0.010 0.008 0.008 0.008 
 % error 59.549 % error 53.333 57.479 55.718 54.602 
4 Outcome 1840.000 IAM Prediction 1612.891 1695.796 1690.102 1683.273 
 HP Forecast 1681.000 Tail Prob Truncated 0.008 0.011 0.011 0.011 
 % error -8.641 % error -12.343 -7.837 -8.147 -8.518 
5 Outcome 2210.000 IAM Prediction 1429.839 1526.466 1512.397 1506.579 
 HP Forecast 1501.000 Tail Prob Truncated 0.024 0.011 0.011 0.012 
 % error -32.081 % error -35.301 -30.929 -31.566 -31.829 
6 Outcome 128.000 IAM Prediction 91.801 96.985 96.592 95.619 
 HP Forecast 90.000 Tail Prob Truncated 0.007 0.010 0.010 0.010 
 % error -29.688 % error -28.280 -24.231 -24.538 -25.297 
7 Outcome 2002.000 IAM Prediction 1828.000 1855.320 1861.382 1867.697 
 HP Forecast 2084.000 Tail Prob Truncated 0.008 0.017 0.018 0.019 
 % error 4.096 % error -8.691 -7.327 -7.024 -6.708 
8 Outcome 1788.000 IAM Prediction 1728.600 1752.300 1746.033 1755.340 
 HP Forecast 1786.000 Tail Prob Truncated 0.008 0.026 0.028 0.021 
 % error -0.112 % error -3.322 -1.997 -2.347 -1.827 
9 Outcome 166.000 IAM Prediction 134.886 126.401 124.748 125.515 
 HP Forecast 119.000 Tail Prob Truncated 0.027 0.061 0.073 0.076 
 % error -28.313 % error -18.743 -23.855 -24.850 -24.389 
10 Outcome 30.000 IAM Prediction 15.178 15.017 15.245 15.150 
 HP Forecast None Tail Prob Truncated 0.148 0.092 0.073 0.072 
 % error None % error -49.407 -49.944 -49.184 -49.498 
11 Outcome 10.000 IAM Prediction 15.158 15.170 15.308 15.337 
 HP Forecast None Tail Prob Truncated 0.083 0.082 0.081 0.085 
 % error None % error 51.583 51.705 53.082 53.368 
12 Outcome 17.000 IAM Prediction 15.708 14.991 15.281 15.366 
 HP Forecast None Tail Prob Truncated 0.085 0.054 0.061 0.064 
 % error None % error -7.602 -11.818 -10.112 -9.612 
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 Table 3: T-Test Comparison between Market Forecasts and Official Forecasts 
 
    Abs % Errors of IAM 
Predictions 
 
   Last Interval 
Ignored 
 Last Interval Mass 
at Lower Bound 
Event Absolute % 
errors of 
HP 
forecasts 
Average 
last 60% 
trade 
Average 
last 50% 
trade 
Average 
last 40% 
trade 
Average 
last 60% 
trade 
Average 
last 50% 
trade 
Average 
last 40% 
trade 
2 13.18% 4.61% 4.57% 4.68% 5.63% 5.68% 5.80% 
3 59.55% 57.48% 55.72% 54.60% 59.25% 57.46% 56.32% 
4 8.64% 7.84% 8.15% 8.52% 6.45% 6.77% 7.13% 
5 32.08% 30.93% 31.57% 31.83% 29.74% 30.33% 30.48% 
6 29.69% 24.23% 24.54% 25.30% 22.94% 23.22% 23.93% 
7 4.10% 7.33% 7.02% 6.71% 5.35% 4.91% 4.55% 
8 0.11% 2.00% 2.35% 1.83% 1.53% 1.39% 1.00% 
9 28.31% 23.85% 24.85% 24.39% 17.55% 17.32% 16.54% 
        
T-test P-
value 
 0.079 0.084 0.071 0.034 0.026 0.022 
        
Random variable x=official error – market error     
H0: mean of x=0       
Alternate: mean of x>0       
 
 
Table 4: Predicting “Above” or “Below” Official Forecasts 
 
Event 
Cumulative 
Probability at 
Official Forecast Prediction Official Forecast Outcome 
1 None N/A None N/A 
2 86.50% down 249 220 
3 53.79% down 1838 1152 
4 35.62% up 1681 1840 
5 37.46% Up 1501 2210 
6 40.70% Up 90 128 
7 76.33% down 2084 2002 
8 42.92% Up 1786 1788 
9 26.49% Up 119 166 
10 None N/A None N/A 
11 None N/A None N/A 
12 None N/A None N/A 
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Figure 1: Home Page for Bidder Participating in the Electronic Market 
Supporting the Information Aggregation Mechanism 
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Figures 2A-1L: Distribution Calculated using Last 50% Trades 
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Figure 2B  
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